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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER 28,
2009

REF: A. GENEVA 01061 (SFO-GVA-VII-045)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 01065 (SFO-GVA-VII-047)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-065.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Participants:

U.S.	RUSSIA
A/S Gottemoeller	Amb Antonov
LTC Leyde	Mr. Vorontsov

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov conducted a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on November 28, 2009. The Russian side received updated guidance from Moscow earlier in the day which was to be discussed in an afternoon plenary session. Gottemoeller relayed the interest that Washington had concerning Russian Gen Makarov's suggestion on telemetry, which envisioned encrypting flight test data and exchanging encryption keys. Antonov expressed concern about the planned arrival of a

National Security Council (NSC)-Department of Defense (DoD) group from the U.S. side, as both sides are preparing for a final push to conclude the treaty early in the second week of December.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russian Delegation Gets Updated Guidance; Russian Side: Help Not Wanted...; ...But the CJSC is Another Matter; Telemetry: Part of a New Relationship?; and Push to the Finish.

RUSSIAN DELEGATION GETS UPDATED GUIDANCE

¶5. (S) Antonov opened the meeting and said the Russian delegation had received updated guidance from Moscow and was still analyzing it. The guidance contained Moscow's response to U.S.-proposals that were tabled during the meetings between Adm Mullen and Gen Makarov (Refs A and B) and NSA Gen Jones and NSA Prikhodko. Antonov said the Russian side had serious proposals, and would like all of the principal members to hear them in a plenary session that would take place later in the day.

RUSSIAN SIDE: HELP NOT WANTED...

¶6. (S) Antonov said he was concerned about the scheduled arrival of U.S. officials from the NSC and DoD, and rhetorically asked how should Moscow react? Should Moscow

send a similar group? Gottemoeller inquired as to how Antonov came to know about the travel plans of these officials; Antonov replied that Amb Kislyak had informed him.

Antonov expressed concern that the arrival of these officials could have a negative effect on the work of the delegations. Antonov emphasized that the Russian side has full authority to make decisions itself. Each side had its instructions.

...BUT THE CJSC IS ANOTHER MATTER

¶7. (S) Antonov said that he felt the visit of Makarov was useful and that it gave Makarov a "taste of the negotiations." He said that the trip made a positive difference in Makarov's understanding of the issues. Gottemoeller added that she had communicated with Adm Mullen, who offered to engage Makarov or potentially to meet Makarov in Moscow if it would help in the successful conclusion of negotiations. Antonov noted that Mullen's engagement was indeed helpful, and opined that only the policy on Afghanistan was higher on President Obama's agenda than the treaty negotiations.

TELEMETRY: PART OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP?

¶8. (S) Gottemoeller brought up the issue of telemetry for discussion. She said that Washington had great interest in the suggestion made by Makarov during the final coffee with Mullen that telemetric flight test data could be encrypted, but that the Russian Federation and the United States would exchange the data and the encryption keys. She indicated that this topic could be included in an upcoming phone discussion between Presidents Obama and Medvedev. Gottemoeller said such an agreement could lead to an expression of a new, special relationship on encryption between the United States and Russia, allowing each side to exchange and understand flight test data of the other side. This could be an important provision for Senate ratification as well. Additional benefits would be the protection of the data from third parties, and therefore strengthening of missile technology controls. Gottemoeller said that the

number of flight tests where encryption could be used was a separate issue. Antonov reacted positively, but expressed doubt that Russia would adopt all of the U.S. positions on telemetry.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller suggested that each side may need to have specialists in telemetry sent to Geneva to discuss the technical details, and inquired if Col Novikov or Col Zaitsev had the necessary expertise. Antonov said that while the Russian delegation did not have telemetry specialists, he felt that this issue was more political than technical, and that Gen Poznikhir had sufficient understanding of the technical details so that a specialist from Moscow would not be necessary.

¶10. (S) Beyond telemetry, Antonov said the other main points of disagreement remained, and listed the relationship between strategic offense and ballistic missile defense, including

reconversion of silo launchers that had been converted for interceptor use.

¶11. (S) Antonov made an observation about the U.S. Senate's views on verification. Several years ago, he noted, the Republican view was that a strict verification regime was unnecessary. Today, he continued, the Republicans have reversed position and called for strict verification.

PUSH TO THE FINISH

¶12. (S) Antonov said that comments in the press by Deputy MFA Ryabkov and MFA Lavrov have ensured the sides are "doomed for success" in concluding the treaty this year. Antonov said that the Russian delegation had attempted to change its departure date from December 6 to December 13. Some technical details remained before this could be confirmed. He believed the treaty could be ready for signature between December 9-11, and highlighted December 11 as the most probable date. He reiterated that the treaty should be signed in Geneva and that Copenhagen or Finland would be unsuitable.

¶13. (S) Gottemoeller noted that as the sides come closer to finishing the negotiations, there will be a great increase in the amount of text that would need to be conformed. She challenged the Russian side to be less "allergic" to language used in START, which had already been conformed. She said that in anticipation of such efforts, the U.S. side is augmenting its legal team. Antonov did not know whether the Russian side would need to augment its legal team. Concerning issues of the conforming process itself, Gottemoeller and Antonov agreed to talk with the conforming teams on Tuesday to reinforce the guidelines and get the conforming teams to work more efficiently.

¶14. (S) Antonov also mentioned that in the next day there would be a new director of the Legal Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amb Givorgan, who previously had been the Russian Ambassador to The Hague.

¶15. (S) Gottemoeller opined that Thanksgiving was probably the last day off for the delegations and that work would continue daily until the treaty was completed. She said that the U.S. side would like the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) to meet daily, and potentially twice a day. Antonov replied that the Russian side would need to review staffing before he could agree to two-a-day meetings for the IPWG.

¶16. (S) On other personnel matters, Antonov said that Ryabkov had told him that Gen Orlov and Col Ilin, who had been summoned to Moscow to report to Minister of Defense Serdyukov, would return no later than Monday evening. In Ilin's absence, Col Petrov had full authority to implement and make decisions within guidance. Petrov was now

authorized to stay until the treaty was concluded.

¶17. (U) Documents exchanged: None.

¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.

GRIFFITHS